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Abstract 
We estimate the direct and external effects of levels of schooling on personal income in Ecuador 
in 2011, using data for 69,653 individuals in 567 municipalities. Using a Mincerian model that 
includes municipal levels of schooling and the size of the municipality and controls for 
endogeneity, we find that each year of individual schooling raises individual income by 8.5 
percent and each year of municipal schooling raises individual income by 2.2 percent.  The 
external effect of an additional year of schooling is larger for workers with more schooling, for 
those with higher incomes, and for those in more educated municipalities. 
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I. Introduction 
In the 1950s Becker, Mincer, and Schultz began to study the effects of education on 
personal and national income.  Since then hundreds of studies of the effect of a worker’s 
schooling attainment on his/her earnings have demonstrated that this relationship is positive 
and relatively consistent across countries over time.  On average each additional year of 
individual schooling raises an individual’s income by 7 to 10 percent [Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos, 2004].    
Lucas [1988] hypothesized that a worker’s level of schooling attainment may have 
positive external effects on income, either on the income accruing to physical capital or on the 
income of other workers.  If a worker’s schooling has external effects on the productivity of 
other workers, and if these effects are substantial, optimal public policy would require a major 
public role in the subsidization of schooling.    
Determining whether a worker’s level of schooling has external effects on the income of 
other workers and estimating their magnitude has turned out to be difficult.  Simple OLS 
regression of workers’ incomes on personal and regional levels of schooling yields estimated 
coefficients for the external effect of regional schooling that in some studies are as large, or 
larger than, the coefficient on the worker’s own schooling.  However, these large effects tend 
to disappear when other regional variables are added to the model or when the regional level 
of schooling is instrumented to control for its endogeneity.    
Most of the existing studies of regional external effects of schooling estimate these 
effects in OECD countries where the data required for these estimates are more widely 
available.  The most sophisticated studies have estimated the external effects in U.S. cities, 
metropolitan areas, and states.  Some of these studies find evidence for the existence of 
external effects, and others do not.  There are several recent studies of the external effects of 
schooling in Europe, but there are few for Latin America.  Estimates for Latin America generally 
are not published in peer-reviewed, international journals, and they rarely control for the 
endogeneity of regional levels of schooling.           
This paper contributes to the empirical literature by presenting the estimates of the 
direct and external effects of average schooling attainment in municipalities on workers´ 
incomes in Ecuador in 2011.  We examine these effects using a modified Mincerian model that 
controls for the municipal level of schooling and other factors, including the size of the 
municipality and the interaction of individuals´ schooling and experience.  The data base 
includes 69,653 individuals in 567 municipalities.  The paper also examines the interaction of 
individual and regional levels of schooling attainment to determine whether the external 
effects are uniform across individuals with different levels of income and different levels of 
schooling.    
Our estimate of the municipal level of schooling is the average level of attainment of the 
individuals within the municipality in the data sample, so the personal and municipal measures 
of schooling are not statistically independent.  We utilize a two-level hierarchical model to 
determine whether the dependence between these levels of schooling noticeably biases the 
results.  Separately, we use the average schooling attainment of males and females over 40 
years of age as instruments to control for the endogeneity of municipal levels of schooling.         
We find that in the standard Mincerian model each additional year of personal  
schooling raises a worker´s income by 9.3 percent.  In the model that includes the municipal 
level of schooling and instruments for this schooling, each additional year of individual 
schooling raises income by 8.5 percent and each additional year of municipal schooling raises 
individual income by 3.9 percent.  The effect of municipal schooling declines to 2.2 percent, but 
remains statistically significant, when a variable for the size of the municipality is added to the 
model.  The estimated external effect varies among individuals, depending on their personal 
characteristics and the characteristics of the municipality.  The effect is larger for workers with 
higher incomes, for workers who have higher levels of schooling, and for those living in more 
educated municipalities.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the literature on 
the external effects of regional levels of schooling. Section III presents the estimation 
methodology and describes the data set.  Section IV presents the results.  Section V concludes.  
II. Review of the Literature 
Rauch [1993] provided one of the first studies of the external effect of regional levels of 
schooling on an individual’s income.  He estimated the effect of average levels of formal 
education in U.S. standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA’s) on total factor productivity 
(TFP) in these areas in 1980, controlling for several regional characteristics other than 
education that could affect income.  He found that an additional year of schooling raised an 
area’s TFP by 2.8 percent.   
The single most influential study in this literature is Acemoglu and Angrist [2000] 
analysis of the external effects of average schooling attainment in U.S. states on individual’s 
salaries over the period 1950-90.  Their study is particularly comprehensive in that it estimates 
effects for different time periods and controls for the endogeneity of both individual and state 
levels of schooling using several instruments, including compulsory schooling laws.   They show 
that an OLS estimate of the external effect of 8 percent per additional year of state schooling 
largely disappears when they control for the endogeneity of state levels of schooling.   In their 
many regressions the estimated external effect of an additional year of average schooling in the 
state on salaries varies, but on average it is only about 1%.  The use of instruments did not 
change the estimated effect of the individual’s level of schooling on his/her own income, but it 
completely changed the estimated external effect of the state level of schooling on this income.   
Ciccone and Peri [2006] use a methodology examining wage differences between skilled 
and unskilled workers to estimate the effect of an additional year of schooling on workers’ 
incomes in U.S. cities and states between 1970 and 1990.  Using Acemoglu and Angrist’s 
instruments, they find no external effects from schooling in cities and an external effect of 2% 
in states that is not statistically significant.   
While these studies are methodologically important, their results are not definitive.  Bils 
[2001] observes that the portion of Acemoglu and Angrist´s sample affected by their instrument 
is limited to the male students forced to remain in school, and that the external effects of 
increased schooling in this component of the sample could be smaller than in the rest of the 
sample.  Rouse [2001] observes that the external effects of increases in post-secondary 
schooling may be greater than the external effects of increases in average schooling 
attainment.   
Moretti [2004] examines the effect of larger shares of college graduates on workers’ 
incomes in cities in the 1980s.  Using instruments for schooling, Moretti finds statistically 
significant effects of the level of schooling that vary depending on the worker´s level of 
schooling.  He found that a 1% increase in the share of college graduates in a city raises the 
salaries of non-high school graduates by 1.9%, of high school graduates by 1.6%, and of college 
graduates by 0.4%.  He also finds that OLS and 2SLS estimates are similar for individuals with 
less schooling, but that 2SLS estimates are smaller than OLS estimates for college graduates. 
Iranzo and Peri [2009] attempt to reconcile Acemoglu and Angrist’s [2000] small 
external effects of an additional year of schooling with Moretti’s [2004] large effects of 
additional post-secondary schooling on workers with less schooling.  They postulate that skilled 
and unskilled workers are not substitutes.  Using the same instruments as Acemoglu and 
Angrist, they find that an additional year of post-secondary schooling raises state TFP by 6-9% 
over the 1960-2000 period, while an additional year of secondary schooling has little or no 
effect.   
Rosenthal and Strange [2008] find that the share of college graduates in a region has a 
positive effect on wages but that this effect attenuates rapidly with distance from employment 
centers.  In their analysis they control for regional characteristics and for the endogeneity of 
schooling.  Their results can explain why studies find larger external effects in U.S. cities than in 
larger regions, such as states.        
These empirical results for the U.S. support the hypothesis that a region’s level of post-
secondary schooling has external effects, but again they are not definitive.  Sand [2013] utilizes 
Moretti’s methodology to re-examine the effect of more college graduates in a city on the 
income of workers with a secondary school education.  He finds that the large external effects 
of a higher share of college graduates on income in the 1980s largely disappeared in the 1990s.  
Heuermann [2011] utilizes Moretti´s model without the physical capital input, using the 
number of schools and students in a region as instruments, to estimate the effect of regional 
levels of schooling on workers´ salaries in Germany during 1995-2001.   He finds that an 
increase in the regional share of highly qualified workers by 1% raises wages of highly qualified 
workers by 1.8% and of non-highly qualified workers by 0.6%.  He also finds that the external 
effects on wages are higher in the manufacturing sector than in the service sector.  His results 
differ from Moretti´s results in that the external effects in Germany are larger for the more 
qualified workers.  However, given the failure to control for other regional characteristics, his 
results may overestimate the external effects of regional schooling.   
Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios [2012] examine the external effect of average levels of 
schooling during 1994-2001 in 14 countries in the European Union on individuals´ salaries at the 
household, region, and adjacent region levels of aggregation.  They also control for certain 
other household, region, and adjacent region characteristics.  They find large statistically-
significant effects at all three levels of aggregation, which in the aggregate are as high as 14% 
for each additional year of schooling.  However, given their failure to control for endogeneity, 
these effects may be overestimated.    
This review of the most relevant literature suggests that regional levels of schooling 
have external effects on workers’ incomes, but that the effect in highly educated countries is 
relatively small.  Analyses that find large external effects generally lack controls for the 
endogeneity of regional schooling or fail to control for other regional characteristics.  Sand’s 
results suggest that the external effects of a higher share of college graduates may disappear 
when this share becomes large.  This interpretation is consistent with Breton’s [2013] findings.  
He shows that the external effect of investment in schooling on labor incomes across countries 
in 1990 exhibits diminishing returns.  If the external effects of regional levels of schooling have 
diminishing returns, then these effects could be larger in Ecuador than in the U.S., since average 
schooling levels are considerably lower in Ecuador than in the U.S.   
III. Methodology Used in the Study 
The literature identifies several statistical problems that may bias the estimated effect 
of regional levels of schooling on individuals’ incomes.  The two most important problems 
appear to be the potential endogeneity of the regional level of schooling and the omission of 
regional characteristics other than schooling in the income model.  A third potential problem is 
the lack of independence between the individual’s level of schooling and the regional level of 
schooling when the regional level is calculated from the data on individuals’ schooling.    
In this study we use several estimation methodologies to identify and control for these 
types of bias in the estimates of the external effects of regional levels of schooling in Ecuador.  
We first use conventional OLS and 2SLS methods to estimate these effects.  We then use two-
level hierarchical modeling (2LHM) to separately treat the individual and municipal schooling 
data.  And finally we use a proxy for the size of each municipality to control for other omitted 
variables that are likely to affect the level of individuals’ incomes in a region.   
Our basic model is a standard Mincerian model of workers’ income as a function of 
individual schooling, experience, and experience2, with two additional variables to represent 
average adult schooling in the municipality and the size of the municipality.  In the model we 
measure income on an hourly basis: 
1) Log(w/hr)i = α0 + α1 indschi + α2 exp + α3 exp
2, + β0 munschj  + β1 munsize +  μj + εi   
where i represents individuals, j represents municipalities, μ represents the random error 
related to municipalities, and ε represents the random error related to individuals within the 
municipalities.   The two error terms are evaluated separately in the models that utilize a two-
level hierarchical estimation procedure.   
Hierarchical models are commonly used in studies of the effect of school characteristics 
on student achievement to control for the dependence of individual and school effects.  They 
have not been used in studies of the external effects of regional levels of schooling, perhaps 
because there is no existing methodology to control for the endogeneity of regional levels of 
schooling in these models. 
We control for the municipal level of infrastructure in some models by including the log 
of the number of individuals in each municipality in the data set.  Since the data set is a 
representative sample of individuals in Ecuador, the number of individual’s in a municipality is a 
proxy for the size of the municipality.  Larger municipalities are likely to be denser and to have 
more infrastructure/individual than smaller municipalities.   
While the Mincerian model is widely used to estimate the effect of schooling on a 
worker’s income, its conceptual validity has been questioned.  Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 
[2008] observe that Mincer created the model to estimate the marginal rate of return on 
investment in schooling.  In deriving the model he assumed 1) schooling has no direct costs 
(i.e., only student time) 2) no income taxes, 3) no loss of working life with additional years of 
schooling, 4) independence in the effects of schooling and experience on income, and 5) 
marginal returns equal to average returns.  They show that actual conditions are sufficiently 
different from these assumptions to invalidate the interpretation that the estimated coefficient 
on years of schooling in the Mincerian model is the marginal return.1  Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos [2004] observe that the estimated coefficient on years of schooling is actually an 
average effect of a year of schooling on a worker’s income, rather than a marginal return on 
investment.  Similarly, the estimated coefficient on (average) years of municipal schooling is an 
average effect.   
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd show that an individual´s schooling and experience often 
are not independent in their effects on a worker’s income.  Experience can have a greater effect 
on workers’ incomes at higher levels of schooling.   
It is possible that an invalid assumption of independence between personal schooling 
and experience in the Mincerian model could bias the estimated effect of municipal levels of 
schooling.  To control for this possibility, we create two interaction variables (sch*exp and 
sch*exp2), which are the products of personal schooling and the experience variables, to 
                                                          
1
 In particular, tuition costs are substantial, and the effect of additional years of schooling is not continuous.  There 
are large “sheepskin” effects, so that completion of a year of schooling with a degree has an effect on income that 
is much larger than completion of a year of schooling without a degree. 
control for the interaction effect.  We examine whether this change affects the estimate of the 
external effect of municipal schooling on personal income in a sensitivity analysis.    
Acemoglu and Angrist [2000] present evidence that OLS estimates of the regional level 
of schooling are biased upward to a substantial degree due to endogeneity.  We create two 
instruments for use with the municipal schooling variable to control for endogeneity.  These 
instruments are the average schooling of females and of males over 40 years of age in each 
municipality.    These measures are highly correlated with the average level of schooling of all 
workers in each municipality.  Since the average schooling of these older residents is unlikely to 
be affected by the current income/hour of a worker in the municipality, these instruments 
meet the exclusion restriction. 
    We obtained the data in the study from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo 
y Subempleo [2011] carried out in December 2011 by the Ecuadorian National Institute of 
Statistics and Censuses.   The dependent variable in the study is log of income/hour, which we 
calculate from data in the survey on income and hours worked.  The average schooling in each 
municipality is calculated from the level of schooling of the citizens between 15 and 65 years of 
age in the sample, without distinction of whether the person was working or not.  The number 
of observations in each municipality varies, depending on the size of the municipality, from 
seven to 3,353.  We calculate workers’ years of experience in the labor force by subtracting 
their years of schooling plus six from their age.     
Since the data used in the regressions are limited to those individuals that report 
income, they are unlikely to be a representative sample of the population.  We control for this 
selection bias by applying the Inverse of Mills methodology created by Heckman [1979]. 
Subsequently, we perform two additional analyses.  In the first we re-estimate the 
Mincerian model with an interaction term between individual schooling and municipal 
schooling (indsch*munsch) to see if the effect of municipal schooling on personal income varies 
by level of individual schooling.  Subsequently, we use a quantile regression methodology to 
determine whether individual and external effects change across the wage distribution.  
Buchinsky [1994] shows that those individuals at the higher end of the distribution benefit 
more from additional personal schooling, but as far as we know, estimates of the variation in 
the external effects of average regional schooling by income level have not previously been 
published. 
  IV. Results 
The first set of results is shown in Table 1.  Column 1 presents the OLS results for the 
standard Mincerian model.  In this model each additional year of personal schooling raises 
workers’ incomes by 9.3 percent.  The magnitude of this effect is consistent with the literature.  
Psacharopolis and Patrinos [2004] report that the average effect of an additional year of 
schooling on income in Latin America is 8.2 percent.  This average pertains to the available 
studies published prior to 2004.   
Column 2 presents the OLS results with the addition of the municipal level of schooling 
to the model.  In this regression each additional year of personal schooling raises workers’ 
incomes by 8.5 percent, and each additional year of municipal schooling raises incomes by 3.9 
percent.  Column 3 presents the results adjusted using the Inverse of Mills methodology for 
selection bias.  The effect of individual schooling increases to 9.1 percent, while the effect of 
municipal schooling declines to 3.5 percent.    
Column 4 presents the 2SLS results using the average level of schooling of the workers 
over 40 in the municipality as instruments for the municipal level of schooling.  In this model 
each additional year of personal schooling raises worker incomes by 8.8 percent and each 
additional year of municipal schooling raises workers’ incomes by 4.2 percent.   The F statistic 
indicates that the instruments are strong, and a Sargan test rejects the hypothesis that the 
instruments are endogenous. The results of these tests are shown in the appendix. 
Colum 5 presents the results for a null model of the two-level hierarchical model 
(2LHM).  The parameter sd(Residual) shows the amount of variance in individual income 
explained by the variation across individuals (0.8057) and sd(_cons) shows the variance 
explained by variation across municipalities (0.3851). These results indicate that 32 percent of 
the variance of hourly wages is explained by differences between municipalities and 68% is 
explained by differences in individuals´ characteristics within municipalities.2  These results 
indicate that an individual´s income is substantially affected by conditions in the municipality 
where he/she resides.  The implication is that a correctly specified Mincerian model must 
include municipal characteristics, such as its average level of schooling and size.     
Table 1 
Effect of Individual and Municipal Schooling on Individuals’ Incomes 
[Dependent Variable is log(income/hour)] 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2LHM 2LHM OLS 2SLS 2LHM 
Constant -0.966 -1.262 -1.182 -1.247 
 
-1.304 -1.257 -1.280 -1.470 
  0.023 0.033 0.039 0.065 
 
0.072 0.041 0.062 0.079 
Inverse of Mills 
  
-0.313 -0.240 
 
-0.119 -0.039 -0.029 -0.075 
  
  
0.086 0.104 
 
0.090 0.093 0.095 0.090 
Experience 0.033 0.031 0.040 0.038 
 
0.034 0.032 0.032 0.033 
  0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Experience2 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ind. Schooling 0.093 0.085 0.091 0.088 
 
0.087 0.086 0.085 0.087 
  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Mun. Schooling  
 
0.039 0.035 0.042 
 
0.040 0.018 0.022 0.024 
  
 
0.003 0.003 0.007 
 
0.008 0.004 0.010 0.008 
Log (Munic Size) 
      
0.036 0.033 0.069 
  
      
0.004 0.007 0.014 
sd(_cons) 
    
0.385 0.265 
  
0.256 
  
    
0.015 0.012 
  
0.012 
sd(Residual) 
    
0.806 0.726 
  
0.726 
  
    
0.004 0.003 
  
0.003 
F Statistic 
   
3857.2 
   
2073.1 
 
R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 
 
0.17 0.23 0.23 0.18 
Total Effect 
 of Schooling 
0.093 0.124 0.126 0.130 
 
0.127 0.103 0.107 0.111 
 
Since individuals within the same municipality in Ecuador share common characteristics 
and aren’t independent from each other, 2LHM should provide less biased estimates than OLS 
estimation. The limitation of hierarchical modeling is that it cannot control for endogeneity, so 
the results may exhibit endogeneity bias.        
                                                          
2
 For more information, see Snijders and Bosker [2012]. 
Column 6 presents the 2LHM results.  A comparison of these results with the analogous 
OLS results in column 2 shows that the statistical dependence between the individual and 
municipal level schooling appears to bias the OLS results downward.  The external effect of 
municipal schooling is 4.0 percent in the 2HLM results compared to 3.5 percent in the OLS 
results.   
These initial results indicate that the municipal level of schooling has substantial 
external effects on workers’ incomes, but it is possible that these effects are due to 
characteristics of the municipalities other than their average level of schooling.  Column 7 
presents OLS estimates of the model, including a variable for the size of the municipality.  In 
these results the size of the municipality has a large statistically significant effect on individual 
income, and the estimated effect of an additional year of municipal schooling falls to 1.8 
percent.   
  Column 8 presents the 2SLS results for the same model.  In these results the effect of 
an additional year of schooling is 2.2 percent.  This estimate is statistically significant at the five 
percent level.  The F statistic indicates that the instruments continue to be strong, and the 
Sargan test continues to indicate that the instruments are exogenous.  A Hausman test of the 
2SLS results indicates that the OLS results are endogenous.  The statistical results for these 
various tests are shown in the appendix.   
Colum 9 shows the 2LHM results for the model that includes the size of the municipality.  
Again the inclusion of the proxy for municipal size is statistically significant and the estimated 
coefficient for the external effect of an additional year of municipal schooling is similar at 2.4 
percent.  Since both the 2SLS and 2HLM estimates are higher, we conclude that the OLS results 
are biased downward and that the 2SLS estimate of the effect of municipal schooling on 
personal income is a conservative estimate of this effect.  As shown in column 8, the total direct 
and external effect of an additional year of schooling in the municipality is 10.7 percent. 
An additional year of municipal schooling appears to raise individuals’ salaries in 
Ecuador about 2.2 percent.  Ideally the individual level of schooling also should have been 
instrumented in the 2SLS analysis to control for endogeneity, but an appropriate instrument 
was not available.  Since Acemoglu and Angrist [2000] found no evidence that OLS estimates of 
the effect of individual´s schooling are biased, we think it is unlikely that any bias in the 
estimated effect of individual’s schooling is biasing the estimated effect of municipal schooling.   
Table 2 presents a sensitivity analysis that estimates the effect of including interaction 
terms between individual schooling and the experience variables in the model.  Column 1 
shows the standard Mincerian model with the addition of this term.  The other three columns  
 
Table 2 
Effect of Schooling on Individuals’ Incomes with Interaction Terms 
[Dependent Variable is log(income/hour)]  
  1 2 3 4 5  
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2LHM OLS 
Constant -0.7275 -1.1123 -1.1367 -1.3415 -0.7652 
  0.051 0.0591 0.0739 0.091 0.0657 
Inverse of Mills -0.672 -0.0393 -0.0272 -0.0761 -0.0330 
  0.085 0.0935 0.0966 0.09 0.0917 
Experience 0.0408 0.0225 0.0221 0.0231 0.0319 
  0.0037 0.0038 0.0039 0.0036 0.0027 
Experience2 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Experience*Schooling 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012   
  0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002   
Experience2*Schooling -1.94E-05 -2.02E-05 -2.02E-05 -2.00E-05   
  3.99E-06 3.95E-06 3.96E-06 3.53E-06   
Individual Schooling 0.0870 0.0693 0.0684 0.0710 0.0228 
  0.0043 0.0044 0.0048 0.0045 0.0070 
Municipal Schooling    0.0177 0.0229 0.0245 -0.0297 
    0.004 0.01 0.0082 0.0063 
Log (Municipal Size)   0.0358 0.0326 0.0695 0.0685 
    0.0045 0.0071 0.0142 0.0043 
Ind. School*Mun. School         0.0060 
          0.0006 
sd(_cons)       0.2561   
        0.0123   
sd(Residual)       0.7257   
        0.0033   
F Statistic     1419.45     
R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.18  0.23 
 
show the results from the full model estimated with OLS, 2SLS, and 2HLM.  The results confirm 
the dependence of individual schooling and experience, since all the estimated coefficients on 
this term are statistically significant at the 1% level, but the estimates coefficients on municipal 
levels of schooling in these models is virtually identical to the estimates in Table 1.  Again the 
2SLS results indicate that each year of municipal schooling raises individuals’ incomes by about 
2.2 percent. 
Column 5 examines whether the external effect of average schooling in the municipality 
is a function of the level of individual schooling by including an interaction term for the product 
of these two levels of schooling.  The estimated coefficients on the individual and municipal 
schooling terms are very different, and the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant.  The results strongly indicate that the external effect of the 
municipal level of schooling is considerably larger for individuals with more schooling, although 
the estimates could exhibit some endogeneity bias.     
Table 3 illustrates the external effects of an additional year of schooling in a municipality 
for workers with various levels of schooling that correspond to the estimates in Column 5.  An 
increase of one year in the average level of schooling from 10 to 11 years raises individual 
incomes by 0.6%, 4.3%, and 6.7% for individuals with these three levels of schooling.   These 
results are consistent with Heuermann´s findings in Germany where the external effects of 
regional levels of schooling are greater for individuals with more schooling.    
    Table 3 
Effect on Income of Moving to a Municipality with a Higher Level of Schooling 
Schooling 
Completed 
Individual 
Schooling 
Muncipal 
Schooling 
Log(wage/hour) Change in 
Income 
 (years) (years)  (percent) 
University 16 10 1.0316  
 16 11 1.0982 6.7 
Secondary 12 10 0.6994  
 12 11 0.7420 4.3 
Primary 6 10 0.2012  
 6 11 0.2076 0.6 
 
Another way to examine the distribution of the external effects of more regional 
schooling is to estimate these effects for individuals with different levels of income.  Table 4 
shows the results from a quantile regression analysis, which shows how the individual and 
external effects of schooling vary with changes in individuals’ income.  The individual effects are 
the same as found by Buchinsky [1994].  Individuals with higher incomes benefit more from 
schooling that those with lower incomes, and the distribution of the external effects exhibits 
the same pattern.   
 
Table 4 
Effect of Schooling on Workers’ Income in a Quantile Regression 
[Dependent Variable is log(income/hour)] 
 Quantile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Constant -2.32903 -1.53132 -1.10456 -0.81998 -0.26839 
  0.07844 0.05013 0.04080 0.05050 0.10868 
Inverse of Mills 0.44371 0.11743 -0.10727 -0.35742 -0.26839 
  0.19669 0.10821 0.09190 0.14221 0.10868 
Experience 0.01420 0.02513 0.03441 0.04599 0.04427 
  0.00568 0.00312 0.00272 0.00381 0.00348 
Experience2 -0.00023 -0.00034 -0.00040 -0.00049 -0.00041 
  0.00007 0.00004 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 
Individual Schooling 0.07092 0.07186 0.08024 0.09438 0.10155 
  0.00471 0.00261 0.00219 0.00274 0.00278 
Municipal Schooling 0.01520 0.01644 0.02591 0.02790 0.03043 
  0.00832 0.00533 0.00374 0.00413 0.00561 
Log (Municipal Size) 0.10458 0.05650 0.01871 -0.00206 -0.01482 
  0.00920 0.00598 0.00441 0.00525 0.00622 
R2 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.19 
Total Effect 
 of Schooling 
0.086 0.088 0.106 0.122 0.132 
  
 
The effect of an additional year of schooling on individual income is 7.1% in the lower 
10% quantile of incomes, while at the 90% quantile the effect is 10.2%.  The external effect of 
an additional year of schooling in the municipality in the lower 10% quantile of incomes is only 
1.5%, while it is 3.0 percent in the 90% quantile.  These results indicate that as individual 
incomes rise from the 10% to the 90% quartile, the total effect of an additional year of 
schooling on incomes increases from 8.6% to 13.2%.   
Table 5 shows results for a quantile model in which individual schooling interacts with 
the level of schooling in the municipality.  The results indicate that there is a positive 
interaction effect between individual and municipal levels of schooling.  More schooling 
consistently raises income, and individuals with higher incomes benefit more from the external 
effects of municipal levels of schooling. 
 
Table 5 
Effect of Schooling on Workers’ Income in a Quantile Regression with Interaction Term 
[Dependent Variable is log(income/hour)] 
 Quantile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Constant -1.92733 -1.13237 -0.56400 -0.24220 0.01150 
  0.12859 0.08695 0.07484 0.07207 0.09096 
Inverse of Mills 0.40011 0.11165 -0.10141 -0.30560 -0.23388 
  0.19867 0.10441 0.06613 0.16265 0.09767 
Experience 0.01469 0.02447 0.03399 0.04386 0.04466 
  0.00543 0.00303 0.00207 0.00441 0.00329 
Experience2 -0.00024 -0.00034 -0.00040 -0.00047 -0.00042 
  0.00007 0.00004 0.00003 0.00006 0.00004 
Ind. Schooling 0.02613 0.02510 0.01602 0.01797 0.02073 
  0.01257 0.00876 0.00768 0.00810 0.01092 
Mun. Schooling -0.02167 -0.02074 -0.02680 -0.02890 -0.02633 
  0.01286 0.00825 0.00802 0.00696 0.00887 
Interaction Effect 0.00430 0.00452 0.00621 0.00721 0.00755 
  0.00113 0.00075 0.00071 0.00067 0.00101 
Log (Munic Size) 0.10519 0.05505 0.01814 -0.00031 -0.01624 
  0.00996 0.00630 0.00500 0.00544 0.00480 
R2 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.19 
 
V. Conclusions 
Numerous studies in the literature have estimated the external effect of regional levels 
of schooling on individual incomes in OECD countries.  These studies generally find a small, 
positive effect, although some studies find a large effect and others no effect.  Few studies 
estimate these effects in Latin America, and these studies generally do not control for the 
endogeneity of regional levels of schooling.   
This study examines the external effect of levels of schooling in municipalities on 
individual incomes in Ecuador, controlling for endogeneity, the size of the municipality, and 
possible interactive effects between individual schooling and regional schooling.  The study also 
controls for the dependence of the schooling data between individuals and municipalities using 
a two-level hierarchical model. 
The results for the null model in the two-level hierarchical estimate indicate that the 
income of an individual is affected by the context in which he lives.  These results indicate that 
in Ecuador 32 percent of the variance in log(income/hour) are determined by the 
characteristics of the municipality.  The implication is that a properly-specified Mincerian 
income model must include urban characteristics, such as the average size and average level of 
schooling in the municipality.    
In all of the results we find that the level of schooling in the municipality has a positive 
effect on individuals´ income.  The magnitude of the estimated effect of schooling on workers´ 
incomes declines when municipal characteristics are included in the model.  In the complete 
model, an additional year of average schooling in the municipality raises income by 1.8 to 2.5 
percent, depending on the estimation technique.  The lower estimates are based on OLS 
estimation, which appear to be biased downward.  A conservative estimate is that in 2011 on 
average an additional year of municipal schooling in Ecuador raised individual income by 2.2 
percent.   
We find that the effect of an additional year of municipal schooling varies depending on 
an individual´s level of schooling, with more educated individuals experiencing a larger effect.  
On average an additional year of schooling raises income by 0.6% for individuals with primary 
schooling, 4.3% for individuals with secondary schooling, and 6.7% for individuals with 
university schooling. 
The effect of municipal schooling also varies depending on an individual’s level of 
income.  At the lower 10% quantile of income, an additional year of schooling raises income by 
1.5% and at the 90% quantile by 3.0%.  The effect of an additional year of schooling on 
individual income is 7.1% in the 10% quantile, while by the 90% quantile it is 10.2%.  The 
associated total effect of an additional year of schooling in these quantiles rises from 8.6% to 
13.2%, indicating that as incomes rise, the external effect of schooling on income increases 
from 21 to 29 percent of the direct effect. 
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Appendix 
Statistical Test Results 
Table A-1 shows the first-stage regression for column 8 in Table 1.  Table A-2 shows the 
results from an endogeneity test and a Sargan overidentifiyng restriction test, which indicate 
that the instruments are valid because they are correlated with the endogenous variable but 
not with the structural error term.   
Table A-1 
First Stage 
Dependent variable Municipal Schooling 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Constant 4.27661 0.06498 
Mills -1.98977 0.17727 
Experience 0.06252 0.00499 
Expe2 -0.00071 0.00007 
Log (Munic Size) 0.48822 0.00687 
Schooling 0.13143 0.00373 
Women 40> Mun. Schooling 0.21170 0.00469 
Men 40> Mun. Schooling 0.03266 0.00417 
 
Table A-2 
Tests of endogeneity 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
Durbin (score) chi2(1) 
 
=  .227053 (p = 0.6337) 
Wu-Hausman F(1,24733) 
 
=  .226982 (p = 0.6338) 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: 
Sargan (score) chi2(1)     =  2.19575  (p   =   0.1384) 
Basmann chi2(1)     =  2.19523  (p   =   0.1384) 
    
Table A-3 shows the results of a Hausman test indicating that the OLS estimates of the 
effect of municipal schooling in column 7 of Table 1 are biased.   
 
 
 
 Table A-3 
  Coefficients    
  2LSL (b) MCO (B) (b-B)  sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
Municipal  Schooling 0.0221135 0.0176651 0.0044485 0.0093358 
Mills -0.0288855 -0.0394592 0.0105738 0.0221477 
Experience 0.0319794 0.0323216 -0.0003422 0.0007171 
Expe2 -0.0003557 -0.0003596 3.87E-06 8.11E-06 
Schooling 0.0849821 0.0856789 -0.0006969 0.0014621 
Log (Munic Size) 0.0328394 0.0355865 -0.0027471 0.0057649 
          
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(5)                           =      (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                                       =      0.023 
Prob>chi2                     =      0.9988 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
